Cependant, le tribunal a publié sa propre série d’affaires sur le droit à un avocat, ce qui a effectivement créé une règle per se interdisant à la police de poursuivre ou de relancer l’interrogatoire avec un suspect qui demande un avocat jusqu’à ce qu’un avocat de la défense soit présent à moins que le suspect lui-même ne puisse prendre d’autres mesures dans le cadre de la procédure. Dans Edwards v. Arizona, 6Footnote451 U.S. 477 (1981). L’interrogatoire initial avait été interrompu dès que le suspect avait demandé un avocat et que le suspect avait été renvoyé dans sa cellule. L’interrogatoire n’a repris que le lendemain, après que divers policiers ont confronté le suspect et l’ont de nouveau averti de ses droits; le suspect a accepté de parler et s’est ensuite incriminé. Nevertheless, the Court held that, where a defendant invoked his right to the presence of a defence lawyer at the hearing, an effective waiver of that right cannot be established by proving only that he responded to other interrogations initiated by the police, even if those rights were brought to his attention. We further believe that an accused who has expressed a desire to negotiate with the police only through counsel will not be subject to further questioning by the authorities until a defense attorney has been made available to him or her, unless the defendant himself initiates further communications, exchanges or conversations with the police.7Footnote451 U.S. at 484-85. The decision was unanimous, but three concurring parties opposed a special arrangement that limits waivers for legal counsel to other suspicious exchanges. Id.
at 487, 488 (Burger C.J. and Powell and Rehnquist J.). In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. In case 1039 (1983), the Court ruled, albeit without the knowledge of the majority of the judges, in full agreement on the ground that an accused who had entered into further discussions with the police had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the presence of a defence lawyer. For example, an accused who agreed to speak to the police but refused to make a written statement without the presence of a defence lawyer was deprived of his rights with regard to his oral statements. Connecticut vs. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987). The Edwards Rule prohibits interrogations initiated by the police following a separate investigation, as well as interrogations related to the crime for which the suspect was arrested.8FootnoteArizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). In contrast, the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is specific to criminal law and does not prohibit questioning about a crime that has nothing to do with the crime for which the suspect was charged. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991). It also applies to interviewed officers from another law enforcement agency.9FootnoteMinnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). A waiver is to “know” whether the suspect was aware of his Miranda rights.
Therefore, the first thing officers must do to pronounce them is a procedure known as “mirandization.” The time window of the exception is small. Once the suspect is formally charged, the sixth amendment`s right to a lawyer would be vested in the Sixth Amendment and secret questioning would be prohibited. [72] The public safety exception applies when the circumstances pose a clear and present threat to public safety and officers have reason to believe that the suspect has information that can end the emergency. [73] An affirmative answer to the two questions above is devoid of rights. If the suspect answers “no” to the first question, the officer must reread the Miranda warning, while the “no” to the second question asserts the right at that time; in both cases, the interrogating officer(s) may not question the suspect until the rights have been lifted. The obligation to warn only occurs when police officers conduct examinations for discovery at trial. The Constitution does not require an accused to be informed of Miranda`s rights as part of the arrest process, or if an officer has a probable reason to arrest, or if the accused has become a suspect at the center of an investigation. Police custody and interrogation are the events that trigger the obligation to warn. Express and implied waivers: A Miranda waiver may be express or implied by the words or conduct of the suspect.
However, most waivers are based on a combination of both. The voluntary standard applies to all police interrogations, regardless of the suspect`s detention status and whether or not the suspect has been formally charged. The remedy for a violation of the standard is the complete suppression of the testimony and all evidence derived from the testimony. Testimony may not be used as physical evidence of guilt or to accuse the testimony of the accused. [Note 30] The reason for this seriousness is the common law`s aversion to the use of forced confessions because of their inherent unreliability. In addition, the right not to be able to confess can be lifted, nor is it necessary for the victim of coercive police conduct to assert his or her right. When considering the voluntary standard, the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court v. Connelly must be taken into account. [96] Although the application of the Connelly Rule by the federal courts has been contradictory and state courts have often failed to recognize the consequences of the case, Connelly clearly noted a significant change in the application of the voluntary standard. Before Connelly, the test was whether the confession was voluntary, given the full circumstances. [97] The term “voluntary” had its everyday meaning: the confession had to be the product of the exercise of the accused`s free will and not of police coercion.
[98] According to Connelly, the examination of all the circumstances is not even triggered unless the defendant can prove coercive behaviour by the police. [99] Issues of free will and rational decision-making are not relevant to a due process application unless there has been police misconduct and a causal link between the misconduct and the confession can be demonstrated. [100] Know your rights: What are Miranda rights? by Stephanie Morrow The language used in a Miranda warning dates back to 1966 in the United States. . . .